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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper contributes to the ongoing debate about the impact of globalisation on welfare 
systems across the world. Its argument is that economic globalisation alters the global balance 
of forces compared with the ‘Golden Age’ of welfare capitalism, but that its impact on 
policies and outcomes is decisively mediated by national and regional ‘welfare regimes’. This 
argument has been developed in relation to the advanced capitalist countries of the North but 
is rarely applied to the South. This paper does so through a case study of five economically 
successful countries in East Asia: Korea, Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines and Indonesia. It 
depicts and analyses their welfare regimes using a new conceptual framework developed at 
the University of Bath. It then considers the impact of the Asian financial crisis, as an 
example of the new risks faced by exposed countries in the global economy. The conclusion 
is that, despite common, sudden and decisive macro-economic problems, the social policy 
reactions have differed across the five countries, in part reflecting variations in their welfare 
regimes.  
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This paper contributes to the ongoing debate about the impact of globalisation on welfare 
systems across the world.
1
 Its argument is that economic globalisation alters the global 
balance of forces compared with the ‘Golden Age’ of welfare capitalism, but that its impact 
on policies and outcomes is decisively mediated by national and regional ‘welfare regimes’. 
This argument has been developed in relation to the advanced capitalist countries of the North 
but is rarely applied to the South. This paper does so through a case study of five countries in 
East Asia: Korea, Malaysia, Thailand, the Philippines and Indonesia. It depicts and analyses 
their welfare regimes using a new conceptual framework developed at the University of Bath. 
It then considers the impact of the Asian financial crisis, as an example of the new risks faced 
by exposed countries in the global economy. The conclusion is that, despite common, sudden 
and decisive macro-economic problems, the social policy reactions have differed across the 
five countries, in part reflecting variations in their welfare regimes.  
 
GLOBALISATION 
 
‘Globalisation’ is frequently alleged to constrain and undermine national welfare states where 
they exist, to stall their development elsewhere, to encourage ‘social dumping’ and to 
generate a ‘race to the bottom’. The effects are claimed to operate via lower tax levels, labour 
standards, social expenditure ratios, coverage of social programmes, and income 
redistribution. Yet evidence to back this up is remarkable by its absence, judging by a sample 
of recent empirical work.
2
  
 
It is not unusual for a taken-for-granted truth to lack evidential support. The lack here 
suggests problems in defining and operationalising one or more of the following: the 
independent variable, the dependent variable, the causal links between the two, the relevant 
time period, and the impact of other factors in the policy environment. To sketch each in turn: 
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‘Globalisation’ is a protean term. A recent survey ranges over increasing global 
connectedness in governance, trade, finance, production, migration, communication, culture 
and the environment (Held et al 1999). The focus of this paper is economic globalisation, but 
even then we must at least distinguish between trade, direct investment, the international 
integration of production, and the globalisation of financial markets. These four elements 
have appeared in roughly this order in the last two centuries of capitalist development, with 
trade taking off in the second half of the 19th century, serious transnational integration of 
production following the Second World War and expanding in the 1960s, and global financial 
deregulation and integration not seriously underway until the 1980s. Each has different 
potential impacts on the ‘welfare state’, suggested in Figure 1. The period from the mid-1980s 
has witnessed accelerating global integration on all fronts, with further tariff reductions, an 
escalation of FDI and a notable integration of financial markets.  
 
One feature of the present period is the enhanced power of capital compared with that of 
nation states and other actors in civil society such as trade unions. Farnsworth and I argue that 
this reflects its greater structural power - the ability of business and finance to influence 
policy without applying direct pressure on government through their agents. This is based on 
‘exit’ rather than ‘voice’, though in practice the two are intertwined (Gough and Farnsworth 
2000). Greater economic openness has enhanced the exit options of capital invested in many 
fields of activity, and, ceteris paribus, has made governments, unions and other actors more 
responsive to capital’s demands. However, there are two important caveats. First, this is not 
something new. In a capitalist society, the owners of the means of production always exert 
structural power of a qualitatively different kind to other actors by virtue of their majority 
control over investment and thus future prosperity. Second, this structural power is a variable, 
not a constant. It varies according to national (and supra-national) institutions and ideologies. 
Thus, among the G7 countries, we find that the structural power of capital grew most in the 
1980s and 1990s in Britain, where restrictions on capital mobility were decisively removed, 
investment was privatised, and labour was unemployed, deregulated and then recommodified. 
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Yet this was not the case - at all or to the same extent - in the other G7 countries. The 
influence of Britain’s institutions and its place in the world economy, and of the neo-liberal 
ideology of the Thatcher government were also decisive. 
 
Globalisation, as defined here, excludes global economic governance. The ideas and leverage 
of the US Treasury, the Federal Reserve, the IMF, the World Bank, and now the WTO are of 
immense importance throughout the developing and transitional world and indeed the OECD 
world. High US interest rates from 1980 onwards and the subsequent injunctions and 
impositions of the IMF and other IFIs on the developing world clearly had a deleterious and 
often catastrophic impact on many countries during the ‘lost decade’ of the 1980s, and on the 
transition process of countries like Russia in the 1990s. If this is ‘economic globalisation’ 
then its impact on the social fabric of much of the world has been powerful and negative. But 
my focus here is on the automatic, non-intentional effects of the processes of economic 
globalisation on the social capacities and outcomes of different nation states. 
 
Second, ‘social policy’, ‘social welfare’ and the ‘welfare state’ are also slippery terms. 
Developed social policies may harm social welfare (as in Apartheid South Africa), high 
spending ratios may signal anti-welfare states (when spent on the military and elites), welfare 
states may not be a necessary or sufficient condition for improved social welfare. This makes 
it difficult to track ‘improvements’ and ‘retrenchments’. It may be desirable for pension 
replacement levels to be cut if they go to the privileged, or if the elderly are more prosperous 
than average, or if generous rates impede the development of alternative social programmes 
to meet new risk structures. Of course, many social programmes contribute to meeting basic 
human needs and other desirable outcomes. But not all do, and there are functional 
alternatives to the classic welfare states of Europe. The welfare state remains contradictory. 
 
Third, the causal link between globalisation and welfare systems is difficult to establish. The 
positive correlation between social expenditure ratios and openness to trade appears to be 
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stronger now than when first identified by Cameron (Rodrik 1998). A recent study of four 
world regions found practically no evidence of trends towards social dumping in Southern 
Europe, Central Europe, East Asia and the southern cone of Latin America (Alber and 
Standing 2000). Others claim the picture is different when specific measures of social 
programmes or indicators of welfare outcomes are used, but then the causal links are more 
tenuous and the measurement problems are greater. 
 
Fourth, the issue of time periods and lags may rescue the pessimistic analysis: it is possible 
that  the full impact of economic globalisation is yet to be witnessed, let alone measured. This 
is especially true of ‘strategic retrenchment’ when measures are put in place to systematically 
slow down or reduce social measures over the medium to long term (Pierson 1994). 
Subsidising private capitalised pensions may raise budgetary costs in the short term but 
reduce them in the longer term by a) encouraging exit from the public system, thus reducing 
claims, and b) undermining political support for future public pensions. These dynamic 
effects on welfare-concerned political coalitions are of great concern. 
 
Lastly, the wider environment may counteract any globalisation influences there are. Pierson 
(1998) has documented the major domestic shifts which are profoundly modifying the social 
policy environments in the OECD world (see the lower half of Figure 1). As he points out, 
few of these have any links with globalisation. Indeed, the moves towards a post-industrial 
service economy directly undermine the globalisation thesis, implying a shift towards more 
non-tradables and location-specific production. Lastly, national social policies are continually 
driven by domestic conflicts and policy feedbacks operating within nationally specific 
institutional forms and constellations of actors. These decisively mediate pressures of 
globalisation. 
 
Figure 1 here 
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The (perhaps obvious) conclusion is that globalisation pressures are always mediated by 
domestic and international institutions, interests and ideas. This argument has been developed 
in relation to the advanced capitalist countries of the North, most notably by Scharpf (2000), 
but is rarely applied to the South (Lee 1999 is one exception). This paper considers social 
policies and globalisation pressures within the framework of comparative welfare regimes in 
the South. 
 
WELFARE REGIMES NORTH AND SOUTH 
 
In the classic formulation of Esping-Andersen (1990), welfare regimes are ways of 
conceptualising the welfare programmes, outcomes and effects of those capitalist societies 
that have been transformed into welfare states. The concept of welfare regime embraces at 
least the following features:  
 
1. the pattern of state social policies and programmes, usually distinguishing social 
assistance, social insurance and universal citizenship modes of distributing benefits in cash 
and in kind; 
2. the wider pattern of welfare provisioning in society, usually in terms of the division of 
responsibility between the state, the market and the household; 
3. the welfare outcomes of these institutions, in terms of the degree of ‘de-commodification’ 
achieved - the extent to which a household’s standard of living is insulated against their 
position in the labour market; 
4. the stratification outcomes of these institutions: how and to what extent the welfare system 
in turn shapes inequalities, interests and power in society and in this way reproduces the 
welfare regime through time. 
 
The first two components are sometimes referred to as the ‘welfare mix’. Thus in a nutshell:  
Welfare regime = Welfare mix + welfare outcomes + stratification effects 
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This all takes place within a constellation of forces and power shaped by the dominant 
‘political settlement’ in that society. Such settlements usually emerge following periods of 
crisis, such as the post-Second World War period in Western Europe. The political settlement 
between classes and other crucial power groups then shapes inequalities, interests and power 
which reproduce the welfare regime through time - until the next crisis. This does not mean 
that welfare regimes cannot adjust to pressures for reform, but it does mean that social policy 
reforms are heavily regime-dependent. 
 
Within the OECD world, Esping-Andersen distinguishes three welfare regimes - the liberal 
(exemplar countries: the US and the UK), conservative (exemplar countries: Germany, Italy) 
and social-democratic (the Nordic countries). One intent is to develop a middle range 
theorisation of welfare systems which avoids, on the one hand, teleological or functionalist 
approaches emphasising commonalities and convergence and, on the other hand, post-modern 
perspectives emphasising national and sub-national uniqueness. In particular, by 
demonstrating the way welfare regimes shape interests, ideas and power constellations in 
different societies, he claims to show that, once established, they follow different paths of 
development. 
 
Can this paradigm be adapted to analyse social policy in the South? There are numerous 
differences which may invalidate such a conceptual transfer. Our work at Bath proposes that 
the original model needs drastic modification to take the following differences on board 
(Wood 2000, Gough 1999). 
 
International factors: 
 A history of colonialism, settler societies or externally-constrained development. 
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 Economic dependency in the international economy. A different position in the 
international political economy marked by a) greater levels of indebtedness and capital 
inflows, b) sectoral imbalances in domestic economies. 
 Political dependency in the international polity. Usually a greater role played by 
international organisations, whether global (WB, IMF, UN etc), supra-national NGOs, or 
powerful Northern states. 
Socio-economic environment: 
 By definition almost, lower levels of marketisation, industrialisation and income. 
 Different forms of peasantry, land ownership, kin structures, household forms and 
gendered relationships. 
 Based on these, different patterns of group formation based more on ascriptive, status-
based identities. 
Political mobilisation: 
 A different distribution of power resources: weaker class organisation of politics and more 
particularistic, regional, patrimonial and clientelistic forms, resulting in the ‘adverse 
incorporation’ of weaker groups. 
State institutions: 
 Less embedded, or absent, democratic practices 
 Lower state infrastructural (though not necessarily repressive) capacities and less 
autonomous state institutions 
Social policies: 
 A greater range of functional alternatives to Western-style social protection beyond the 
state (religious, enterprise-based, NGO, foreign aid, local/communal, clan and household 
provision). 
 A greater range of functional alternatives to Western social protection programmes within 
the state (e.g. consumption subsidies, agricultural support, work programmes, micro-credit 
schemes) 
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 The traditional boundaries of social policy need extending still further to include 
improving governance and voice. 
Welfare outcomes: 
 Again almost by definition, lower levels of welfare outcomes, except among the rich. 
 De-commodification is less relevant or irrelevant as an index of welfare outcomes: 
alternative and more direct measures are required. 
 
This huge range of contrasts urges caution in applying welfare regime analysis to the South. 
On the other hand, these dimensions offer a rich matrix for understanding differences within 
the developing, transitional - and declining - worlds of the South. The welfare regime 
approach has much to offer if appropriately reformulated. First, the welfare regime approach 
is precisely concerned with the broader ‘welfare mix’: the interactions of public sector, 
private sector and households in producing livelihoods and distributing welfare: a fruitful 
theme in the development literature. Second, it is a ‘political economy’ approach which 
embeds welfare institutions in the ‘deep structures’ of social reproduction: it forces 
researchers to analyse social policy not merely in technical but in power terms, and this has 
much to offer. Third, it enables one to identify clusters of countries with welfare features in 
common; it holds out the promise of distinguishing between groups of developing countries 
according to their trajectory or paths of development. With this approach we can avoid the 
ludicrous situation where common and universal remedies are proposed for Malawi, 
Malaysia, Mexico and Moldova. It accords mutual respect to global pressures and regime-
specific features within the ‘South’ as well as the North. 
 
In order to enjoy these benefits without imposing inappropriate frameworks, we propose to 
extend the welfare mix, or the ‘institutional responsibility matrix’ (Wood 2000), to include 
the eight components in Figure 2. The task of developing an appropriate social politics in 
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underdeveloped, developing, and transitional countries entails at least this degree of 
conceptual innovation. 
 
Figure 2 here 
 
The remainder of this paper describes, analyses and conceptualises the welfare regimes of 
five East Asian countries: Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, the Philippines and Thailand. They are 
of interest for several reasons. First, they are all participants in the ‘East Asian miracle’ and 
beneficiaries of the alleged benefits of economic openness and market-friendly policies 
(World Bank 1993). Second, they all fall within the second regime cluster of countries with 
restricted social policies but relatively good welfare outcomes. Third, they were all notable 
victims of the Asian financial crisis of 1997-99, and thus provide a good test case of the 
downside, as well as the upside, of globalisation. It is for this third reason that this paper 
focuses in particular on these five countries. 
 
WELFARE REGIMES IN EAST ASIA  
 
Notwithstanding these similarities, the five countries differ in many respects, including level 
of development. Korea is an upper income group country, and now a member of the OECD. 
Its income per capita is double that of the next richest, Malaysia, which in turn is roughly 
double that of Thailand, which in turn has roughly double the per capita income of the 
Philippines and Indonesia. These are wide divergences, though, when calculated at 
purchasing power parity, the overall gap between Korea and Indonesia falls to 4.4:1 (see 
Table 1). Our focus in this paper is thus on four major countries of Southeast Asia plus Korea. 
As we shall see, Korea is an outlier, a representative of Northeast Asian welfare capitalism, 
and thus provides a useful pole of contrast with which to compare the Southeast Asian 
countries. This section describes the welfare mix and welfare outcomes of these countries 
before analysing and speculating about their welfare regimes. 
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Table 1 here 
 
Institutional programmes: the welfare mix 
 
State social policies 
 
State revenues and expenditure account for just below one fifth of GDP in Southeast Asia, not 
noticeably lower than in other middle income countries, but public social expenditures are 
very low except on education. Total spending on education, health and social security varies 
with level of development, ranging from 3% of GDP in Indonesia, 6% in the Philippines and 
Thailand to 8% in Malaysia and 11% in Korea. The share of total government spending 
devoted to social services is less than one half, varying between around one quarter in the 
Philippines to just over one half in Korea. However, rapid growth means that real resources 
devoted to the social sector have expanded faster than in most countries. There is a 
generalised hostility to Western ideals of the ‘welfare state’ except paradoxically for 
employees of the state - social provision for civil servants, the military and police, teachers, 
etc is everywhere extensive and generous. 
 
East Asian governments have consistently emphasised the central role of education in 
economic development, though this is not matched by a higher than average expenditure for 
middle income countries. But with fast economic growth real spending has climbed rapidly 
(except in the Philippines) and the general verdict is that the allocation of resources is more 
rationally targeted on basic education than in other developing countries (World Bank 1993: 
192-203). All five countries have achieved near-universal primary education. Secondary 
school enrolment is rising but the countries are at different stages on this path: the Philippines 
and Korea had enrolled over one half of children in the 1970s and Malaysia in the 1980s, 
whereas Thailand and Indonesia still remain below this level. 
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Health expenditure is low in East Asia compared with other middle income countries and 
actually fell as a share of GDP in the 1990s in all countries except Thailand (Ramesh 2000: 
Table 4.5). Since private spending accounts for about one half of the total, public health 
expenditure is remarkably low - between 0.7% GDP in Indonesia and 2.3% in Korea. Not 
surprisingly, all health inputs (doctors, nurses, hospital beds) are very scarce on a world scale. 
Yet all countries provide reasonable access to basic and preventive health care, with Korea 
and Malaysia as the best performers. ‘The widespread availability of public health care in 
Southeast Asia suggests that most sick people have some access to health care’ (Ramesh 
2000: 113). Beyond this, there are significant inequities. The dominant medical system in the 
region is ‘public provision - private finance’. In all countries civil servants and state 
employees have their own superior systems of insurance and provision, private provision is 
rising until interrupted by the financial crisis, and different measures to decentralise or 
‘corporatise’ public hospitals, or to contract-out key services are being tried out. The rich 
have the further option of treatment abroad in regional centres such as Singapore, Hong Kong 
and Australia. A general hierarchy can be observed in medical treatment: overseas > private > 
public > self-medication and traditional medicine - though the latter has a high status in 
Thailand (EIU 1999). 
 
All countries have a some form of public health insurance, apart from Malaysia which is 
closer to a national health service. The Philippines has a long-established health insurance 
system, but with low coverage and erratic provision of services. The 1995 National Health 
Insurance Act plans to provide universal health care by 2010. In the space of a little over a 
decade Korea has moved to a fully-fledged National Health Insurance System - universal and 
integrated but with high copayments and not yet redistributive. Thailand and Indonesia have 
both introduced health insurance for limited sections of the population backed up by medical 
assistance schemes. Malaysia has a more British-style National Health Service, backed up by 
personal medical accounts within the Employee Provident Fund. Roemer in 1991 classified 
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the Malaysian health care system as ‘welfare-oriented’ in contrast to the other four which he 
labels ‘entrepreneurial’. Korea may now be moving towards the former. 
 
Public spending on social protection, including pensions, is remarkably low in comparative 
perspective, whatever the comparator (Asher 1998, ADB 1998). Again, pensions for civil 
servants, the military and some other public sector employees are the exception. For the rest 
of the population, the national pension systems divide into two main types: social insurance in 
the Philippines, Korea and Thailand, and provident funds in Malaysia and Indonesia. The 
Filipino scheme is more than forty years old and continues to expand its coverage, including 
voluntary membership even for Filipinos working overseas. Replacement rates are high at 
around 60%, but the employer compliance rate is low, with up to two thirds of the paper 
members not contributing at any one time (Ramesh and Asher, 2000: 71). From a late start in 
1988, the National Pension Scheme in Korea is extending its coverage and building up a 
transitory fund over a 20 year period - full pensions will not start until 2008. Thailand, in 
January 1999 added an old age pension element to the Social Security Act of 1990. This is a 
defined benefit pay-as-you-go scheme but will not pay out full pensions until 2014. Non-
compliance or evasion is estimated to be high. 
 
The Malaysian Employee Provident Fund, the first in the world and now in its 50th year, is a 
developed, expensive and savings-effective fund. Since 1994, members have been able to opt 
for an annuity instead of a lump-sum. Reforms have established separate accounts for 
education and health and have encouraged more flexible individual investment. However, the 
EPF provides weak protection against poverty in old age, offers insecure returns and, through 
tax exemptions and other features, is perversely redistributive. Despite an almost equally long 
history the Jamsostek fund of Indonesia has a small coverage, uneven record keeping and tiny 
reserves, but coverage has climbed in the 1990s. It provides only a lump sum payment on 
retirement. 
 
 15 
Formal safety nets can be defined as public programmes targeted to the poor with the 
objective of raising living standards to a specified social minimum. They can take the form of 
cash transfers, public works employment and subsidies for important need satisfiers, such as 
food and housing. They are limited in scale, coverage and cost throughout the region, but they 
have been expanded in response to the crisis. As a share of GDP they are most extensive and 
expensive in Korea (2% GDP in 1999) and Indonesia (planned 1.25% GDP in 1999-2000), 
but are tiny in Malaysia and Thailand (World Bank 1999a: Table 3). The extensive Korean 
public works programmes were a short-term response to mass unemployment and have since 
almost disappeared to be replaced by the more significant public assistance reform of 1999. 
 
Market 
 
Access to the labour market is a major resource in East Asia, as in the OECD, and the 
expansion of wage labour in the region has been remarkable. Over the last two decades until 
1997 the labour force grew by 2% pa. The regional participation rate is high: ranging from 
89% in Thailand to 66% in Malaysia. This labour force is becoming feminised but, with the 
exception of Thailand where it is higher, the overall share of women at about 40% is roughly 
the world average. Until the economic crisis of 1997-98, unemployment rates were 
consistently low, except in the Philippines; they escalated during the crisis of 1997-98 (World 
Bank 1999a: 14), but are now declining. Despite remarkably extensive labour legislation 
covering minimum wages, hours of work, paid leave, employment security, protection against 
dismissal, redundancy pay and occupational health and safety (Deery and Mitchell 1993, Rigg 
1997: 223-27), protection in practice is poor due to weak government agencies, bribery of 
officials and weak trade unions. Nevertheless, growing access to the formal labour market - 
commodification - has been a critical feature of East Asian welfare regimes. 
 
The private market for social services is substantial and fast-growing. One half of all 
education spending and almost two thirds of all health spending is privately financed. Much 
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of this is reactive and unorganised, comprising out-of-pocket expenditures, book purchases, 
self-medication etc. The dominant pattern is of ‘mainly private finance and mixed provision’ - 
unlike OECD countries, where public finance plus mixed provision is more typical. For 
example, Korean households spend 10% of their income on education and 5% on health, 
compared to 1.4% and 1.3% in the UK (Shin 2000). Government regulation of private 
providers is typically weak, but is becoming more proactive. In 1999 Malaysia decided not to 
privatise or ‘corporatise’ its public hospitals (EIU 1999), though it is now directing its EPF to 
invest more in equities, owner-occupation and private stock purchases, which indirectly 
encourages privatised provision. There is as yet little development of private life insurance or 
pensions. 
 
Community, civil society and NGOs 
 
Non-profit and non-governmental organisations active in the field of human development and 
welfare are a very recent phenomenon in East Asia, where in the past they have been 
discouraged by authoritarian regimes (Yamamoto 1999). The one exception is the Philippines 
where they have a longer history due to the American legacy and the Catholic church. 
Community development is now a burgeoning part of social policy, and includes such 
innovations as community health financing in Thailand. However, the total amount of such 
funds is small relative to Thailand’s total health expenditure. Moreover, all NGOs remain 
heavily dependent on external sources for funds, notably official overseas aid organisations, 
US philanthropic funds and Japanese corporate funds. In Korea, the chaebol have generated 
philanthropic corporate funding to an extent unknown in the other countries - mainly as a 
form of tax avoidance.  
 
Family - household 
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Throughout East Asia, the extended family persists as a provider, saver and redistributor, 
despite rapid economic development and urbanisation. The level of savings is extremely high 
in East Asia, the Philippines excepted. This should permit more families to mitigate risk by 
‘self-insuring’: saving in good times and dis-saving in bad times (World Bank 2000: Chapter 
5). However, despite impressive development of micro-finance and credit schemes, the 
unequal distribution of incomes in the region undermines this. Calculations of private 
transfers show high levels in the Philippines, Indonesia and Malaysia, adding between 9 and 
20% to the average incomes of recipient households. They outweigh public transfers by 
several orders of magnitude. In the 1980s, the majority of people over 60 years were receiving 
income from family members and an even higher proportion lived with children or family - 
between 3/4 and over 90% in the Philippines and Thailand. These remarkably high 
proportions are now falling in Korea, from 78% in 1984 to 49% in 1994. 
 
International agencies 
 
Official development assistance by the OECD countries fell throughout the 1990s as a share 
of donors’ GNP, recipients’ GNP and in dollars per head. Before the Asian financial crisis, 
Korea and Malaysia received no ODA, but it remains of some significance - between 0.4-
0.8% GNP - in the other three countries. Despite short-term crisis aid to countries such as 
Indonesia in 1997 and 1998, this is now a marginal contributor to the East Asian welfare mix. 
 
In contrast, international firms see the region as a growing market for a variety of health 
products, ranging from drugs (self-medication is rife) to health maintenance organisations. 
This is mainly the result of gaps in public provision, but is increasingly being sponsored by 
governments. For example, Indonesia permitted for-profit hospitals in 1988, extended this to 
foreign investment in large hospitals in 1994 and, in 2003, will permit unrestricted foreign 
investment in all health care (EIU 1999: 115). There is also a growing market for overseas 
health treatment of the rich, notably in regional centres such as Singapore, Hong Kong and 
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Australia. In education, a persistent shortage of university places in Malaysia and, to a lesser 
extent, in Thailand has encouraged study abroad, mainly in English-speaking countries, and 
‘twinning’ arrangements with foreign institutions - another form of internationally marketised 
provision. 
 
The dominant international household strategy is labour migration and remittances of money. 
The Philippines is a big exporter of labour. By 1995 1.5m Filipinos lived abroad as permanent 
immigrants and a further 2m at least worked temporarily abroad or at sea (Woodiwiss 1998: 
101). The remittances they send home amount to 6.4% of Filipino GNP, and 10% if 
unrecorded cash and goods brought home by workers are included (ILO 2000: Tables 2, 4). 
These flows, together with the household flows within the country discussed above, constitute 
a significant element of the Filipino welfare regime. At the opposite extreme, Malaysia, a net 
importer of labour, has been able to control unemployment among Malaysians by offloading 
the recent crisis in the labour market onto immigrants. 
 
In summary, the welfare mix in the region is one of relatively low public responsibility (in 
terms of expenditure, provision and regulation), extensive family provision and redistribution, 
and growing private markets and community-based organisations. Until the 1997 financial 
crisis, the countries had been curtailing their dependence on aid, but they have increased their 
openness to commercial penetration from abroad. Within the public sector priority is given to 
social investment in health and education, notably basic health care and primary education, 
with very little attention to social protection. In all countries, state personnel are supported 
most generously. 
 
Welfare outcomes 
 
Mortality, including infant mortality, has declined remarkably in the last three decades, most 
notably in Korea and Malaysia. The provision of sanitation, water and preventive health is 
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also superior to comparator countries. Less impressive are the high levels of maternal 
mortality and child malnutrition, notably in Indonesia and the Philippines. These are 
symptomatic of a major failure to diminish further inequalities in health and access to health-
related services such as immunisation, obstetric care, piped water and sanitation. The region 
also faces new health threats, stemming from ageing and the epidemiological transition, 
urbanisation (e.g. traffic accidents) and lifestyle changes (e.g.. more smoking) (World Bank 
1999b). Korea and Malaysia do better on all fronts, whereas the Philippines does worse than 
its income level would warrant. 
 
Illiteracy is all but eradicated in Korea, the Philippines and Thailand, but persists in Malaysia 
and Indonesia. Gender differences are low in a comparative context. This may reflect the 
relatively egalitarian nature of gender relations in the region when compared with Northeast 
and South Asia.
3
 Measures of quality in education outcomes show a different pattern: Korea 
is a world leader, whereas Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand fall below the 
‘international mean’ (data is not available for Malaysia) (Mingat 1998: 701). 
 
The region (apart from the Philippines) has witnessed an impressive reduction in poverty rates 
from above 40% in the 1970s to around 10% or less in the 1990s. However, inequality is high 
and rising (Atinc and Walton 1998: 10). Furthermore, income distribution data typically 
excludes capital gains. The huge asset inflation in real estate and financial valuations 
throughout East Asia in the 1990s has undoubtedly worsened inequality still more. At the 
other extreme are groups suffering from significant and quasi-permanent social exclusion, 
including ‘hill peoples’, migrant workers, street children, orphans and refugees (Rigg 1997, 
ch.4, World Bank 1999a: 6).  
 
‘De-commodification’ has less meaning in societies with significant agricultural and informal 
labour and is not systematically measured in East Asia, but we may be confident that it is low. 
Labour in Southeast Asia is either pre-commodified, working in subsistence agriculture, or it 
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is commodified - reliant on the labour market with few statutory protections or substitutes. 
Indeed, opportunities to participate in the labour market are a key feature of the East Asian 
welfare regime. One measure of these are higher educational opportunities, where differences 
are wide. Korea offers the greatest opportunities with a tertiary enrolment rate of 50%, with 
the Philippines (27%) and Thailand (21%) some way behind. Most surprising here is the low 
access to tertiary education in Malaysia (10%). 
 
To summarise, in terms of welfare outcomes the region achieves high scores across health, 
education and poverty reduction. However, there are persistent gaps and inequalities, 
especially in less well monitored areas such as morbidity, school drop-out rates, working 
conditions and social exclusion. Notwithstanding these numerous blots, on the Richter scale 
of social development East Asia achieves something akin to the liberal alchemists’ dream: 
relatively good welfare outcomes at very low cost in terms of public social expenditure. 
 
Putting together welfare mixes and welfare outcomes we can identify national variations. 
Korea, by far the richest economy, has higher standards of educational and other social 
outcomes. Now it is embarking on a rapid and thorough-going expansion of social insurance. 
The Philippines enjoys much lower growth, a long-established, segmented and partial social 
insurance tradition, high levels of unemployment, poverty and inequality, yet good access to 
education. The outcome has been labour emigration and high remittances which augment the 
role of the family. Malaysia has a different policy profile with its Provident Fund alongside a 
British-influenced national health system and relatively low levels of private finance. 
Indonesia and Thailand, despite remarkable growth, are at present less institutionally 
developed and differentiated as welfare regimes.  
 
From welfare mix to welfare regimes 
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Attempts to explain East Asian social policy have mainly concentrated on the most developed 
economies: the Four Tigers of Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore, only the first of 
which is represented in this study. I shall begin with this literature before addressing the 
countries of Southeast Asia.
4
 The explanations of this distinct welfare regime can be divided 
into two levels: those which privilege different components of the welfare mix (though not 
usually expressed in this way) and explanations which situate these in a broader sociological 
or political economic setting. 
 
The other components of the welfare mix identified by Esping-Andersen (1997) and Jacobs 
(1998) are: 
 Market: fast rising incomes plus a reasonable distribution of factors incomes permits a 
very high savings rate and fast rising private finance of welfare. This both reflects and 
contributes to low taxes and the lack of public alternatives. 
 Enterprise: social benefits, employment protection and seniority wages continue to play a 
substantial role. They underpin a ‘male breadwinner model’ of welfare, by providing good 
benefits for primary sector workers which can only be redistributed within the family. This 
generates vested interests in their retention. 
 Family-household: a ‘modified stem family’ has emerged in which the majority of elderly 
live with children. Income pooling within families reduces middling-high inequality 
between individuals resulting from the male breadwinner model. This partly feeds off the 
lack of public sector alternatives and in turn reinforces the enterprise-household regime 
through discouraging employment opportunities for women and young people. 
 
Broader explanations of this pattern of policies and outcomes can be roughly divided into 
three (Holzer 2000 develops an interesting conceptual synthesis): 
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 Cultural: ‘Confucian values’ is a protean notion, but has been advanced as an explanation 
because of its emphasis on family obligations, education, paternalism and social harmony. 
However, in earlier incarnations it was used to explain Asian backwardness due to its 
emphasis on respect for authority. White and Goodman (1998: 16-16) reject this 
explanation on the grounds, among others, that it is essentialist, static, abstract and over-
elastic. 
 International: Economic openness is hardly unique to East Asia, but it developed early in 
the region, and the East Asia states have for long ‘made a virtue out of this necessity’ 
(Holliday 2000). Their post-war history of political vulnerability, US hegemony and 
centrality in the Cold War is another explanation of their role as successful models of the 
globalisation strategy. 
 Developmental state: This is usually defined as a state where elite policy makers set 
economic growth as the fundamental goal and pursue a coherent strategy to achieve it. 
This can be combined with different social policies, but all entail the explicit subordination 
of social policy to economic policy and economic growth. It requires that state policy 
makers be relatively insulated from interest groups and have a high degree of internal 
coherence and loyalty. 
 
Holliday (2000) proposes that (North) East Asia comprises a fourth welfare regime of  
productivist welfare capitalism, in which social policy is subordinated to economic policy. 
Within this generic welfare regime, Korea, alongside Japan and Taiwan, constitutes a 
developmental-universalist mode, where the state underpins market and family provision with 
some universal programmes, mainly to reinforce the position of productive elements in 
society. From 1960 to 1987, Korea combined an authoritarian developmental state with a 
residual, competitive form of social policy. In particular the social ministries were 
subordinated to the Economic Planning Board and its goals, which permitted state spending 
only on productive social investments, notably education (Shin 2000).
5
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Welfare regimes in Southeast Asia  
 
To what extent does Southeast Asia replicate the welfare regime pattern of Northeast Asia? 
Research in this region is scarcer, though Ramesh (2000) fills some of the gaps. Hence the 
following is devoted to drawing similarities and contrasts between Southeast and Northeast 
Asia. 
 
Business 
 
Business in Southeast Asia is more internationalised than in Northeast Asia and more open to 
multinational penetration. Inflows of direct investment are relatively free and substantial 
compared with the tightly controlled capital markets of Northeast Asia. These are not the 
‘group-co-ordinated economies’ of Japan and Korea, with strong vertically and horizontally-
integrated keiretsu and chaebol. In addition, business in Southeast Asia has traditionally been 
dominated by the Chinese who enjoy economic power but suffer, to varying degrees, political 
exclusion. Domestic capital is developing and organising throughout the region, but it 
remains fragmented and retains close links with political elites (Hawes and Liu 1993). The 
state, and in particular its technocrats, is less insulated from business pressures than in 
Northeast Asia and is as a result somewhat less autonomous. 
 
Businesses’ interpretations of their interests are short-term, neo-liberal and anti-welfare. 
Southeast Asian capital is less likely to develop enterprise welfare or to support state welfare 
than its North-eastern counterpart. However, this does not rule out statist initiatives in social 
policy, since the topic (unlike trade, tax and economic policy) is generally of low salience for 
business. When other factors push for greater social programmes, the states have not been 
constrained in developing them. 
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Democracy and civil society 
 
The dominant form of governance for the last four decades has varied between the brutal, the 
authoritarian and the ‘semi-democratic’ (Neher and Marley 1995). No country except the 
Philippines experienced democracy before WW2, and all have suffered military take-overs or 
periods of authoritarian rule in the last two decades. In addition, personalised patron-
clientelist relations and a dominant party system undermine ideological politics and 
encourage segmental politics. Tanzi’s (1998) index of corruption also reveals very high levels 
in the region, Malaysia partially excepted. This has perpetuated a weak civil society. Only in 
the Philippines can one identify a flourishing civil society in the pre-Marcos years and again 
since 1986. With the end of the Cold War, NGOs are encouraged and are expanding fast, but 
they remain strongly controlled in Malaysia and are regulated in Thailand and Indonesia 
(Yamamoto 1995). Thus democratic pressures for social policies from outside the state 
remain weak. 
 
Labour 
 
For the same reasons, since the late 1960s labour in the region has been ‘weak, divided and 
tamed’ (Deyo 1997), despite unprecedented growth in industrialisation, wage labour, literacy 
and other correlates of trade union activity. Trade unions have been periodically subject to 
draconian measures throughout the region. Membership is low and is largely confined to state 
sector workers and other narrow groups. Dominant union federations are subservient to 
regime interests. When in the late 1980s liberalisation beckoned, unions were constrained by 
the new forces of globalisation. In Deyo’s (1997) words, labour organisations in Southeast 
Asia have moved directly ‘from repression to deregulation’. Compared with the West, the 
ability of the labour movement to win social reforms has been severely constrained. 
 
Agriculture, rural development and household strategies 
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Southeast Asia is a resource-rich region which to a far greater extent than in Northeast Asia  
remains a region of farmers. However, this is an agriculture which has long been semi-
marketised, for several decades has been dynamic and which is now supporting ‘rural 
industrialisation’ (World Bank 1993: 32-37; Rigg 1997: 191) or ‘smallholder-based rural 
development’ (Atinc and Walton 1998: 6). The interactions between the rural and urban 
worlds offer important clues to understanding the welfare regimes of the region. Essentially, 
the rich rural hinterland supports family strategies which can successfully mix different 
livelihoods. Growing agricultural incomes and consumption demand can finance non-farming 
employment which absorbs rural labour and permits further investment and productivity and 
income increases in agriculture. In addition, this undermines the salience of urban factory life 
for many of the young family members who seek work in the cities, which further weakens 
labour organisations. Above all, income mixes within the wider family and household 
transfers provide an alternative for many to state welfare - which undermines further 
pressures for reform. 
 
Statism, legitimacy and social policy 
 
Social policy in East Asia can be characterised as ‘bonapartist’: ‘The Bonapartist approach 
regards social policy in a politically functional sense as a means used by social elites of 
preserving the status quo, side-stepping the threat of major reform by granting modest 
concessions to increasingly important but still largely disenfranchised classes’ (Baldwin 
1990: 39). Baldwin goes on to criticise the usefulness of this explanation in Europe because it 
cannot explain how social policy can ever develop beyond the minimum necessary to 
maintain the existing order. In Southeast Asia it has largely not progressed beyond this level, 
so the concept might do quite well. However, it needs further elaboration to avoid 
functionalist overtones. Drawing on Kwon (1998) and Ramesh (2000: ch.6), I shall 
distinguish three aspects here. 
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First, social policy can play an important role in nation-building in post-colonial states. The 
region is replete with different colonial experiences: Japan in pre-war Korea, the US in the 
pre-war Philippines, the Netherlands in Indonesia before 1949 and the British in Malaysia 
until 1957. All have influenced subsequent social policies: the American educational legacy 
in the Philippines, and the British-legislated Employee Provident Fund in Malaysia are two 
notable examples. Only Thailand lacks a colonial inheritance, and the influence of the 
Japanese occupation of Korea does not match its impact on Taiwan. Social policy has also 
been used as an agency of nation-building in post-colonial era in the Philippines, Malaysia 
and Indonesia. Malaysia developed its bumiputera policies to strengthen ethnic solidarity 
through positive discrimination towards Malays, while Indonesia rapidly extended national 
education in the post-independence years in part to develop Bahasa Indonesian as the national 
language (Steinberg 1971: chapter 35). In the Philippines Magsaysay adopted an almost 
Bismarckian policy of toughness plus concessions in the face of the Huk People’s Liberation 
Army in the early post-war years (SarDesai 1994: chapter 19). The 1957 Social Security 
System may be seen as the culmination of this process; ever since it has imparted a different 
dynamic to social protection compared with the rest of the region.  
 
Second, there is the need to secure the loyalty of the elite and of key state personnel. Such 
‘etatist’ social policy has a long history in Europe, and is clearly evident throughout East Asia 
as the extent and generosity of benefits for civil servants, the military and other crucial state 
sector workers attest.  
 
Third, there is the role of social policies in legitimising undemocratic regimes, noted in the 
development of 19c European social policy. Ramesh develops such an explanation of social 
policy development in Southeast Asia, arguing that significant policy initiatives have 
occurred at times of internal threats, such as the 1950s communist insurgency and following 
the 1969 race riots in Malaysia, or in the late 1960s and early 1970s in Indonesia following 
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rioting against the imposition of the New Order. Kwon and Shin also puts forward convincing 
arguments along the same lines for Korea during the authoritarian Park and Chun regimes. 
More evidence for the legitimising role of such social policies as have developed in the region 
comes from the well-attested gap between legislation and implementation (Shin 2000). For 
example, the Korean National Pension Programme was enacted by the Park regime in 1973 
yet not implemented until 1988 by the Rho regime fifteen years later. This practice, which is 
found elsewhere in the region, suits a regime which wishes to give the impression of action 
without challenging core interests by actually delivering. 
 
WELFARE REGIMES AND THE EAST ASIAN CRISIS 
 
These, then, were the welfare regimes suddenly overwhelmed by the East Asian crisis in 
1997. In summary, all were examples of ‘productivist welfare capitalism’ with social policy 
subordinated to economic policy and the imperatives of growth. Social expenditures were 
small but relatively well targeted on basic education and health as part of a strategy of nation-
building, legitimation and productive investment. The growth in welfare over the last three 
decades has relied on the expansion of formal employment within the orbit of strong families, 
plus growing payment for services. Overseas aid was diminishing but the social sectors were 
open to foreign commercial penetration. 
 
The main social effects of the crisis came through the following mechanisms: 
 collapsing currency values, which generated higher import prices and extensive internal 
price changes, including falling asset values 
 a drastic fall in output and thus in demand for labour 
 falling state revenues and a squeeze on public spending 
 fears of the erosion of the social fabric 
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In other words, the openness of the East Asian economies exposed them to an external shock 
which brought about a Keynsian-style collapse in demand (see Table 2). Moreover, at the 
same time the Philippines, Indonesia and Thailand suffered a severe drought. 
 
Table 2 here 
 
The social impact of the crisis has been portrayed and analysed by Manuelyan Atinc and 
Walton (1998) and Manuelyan Atinc (2000). Poverty rates rose in all countries as did the 
depth of poverty. The demand for labour and the share of wages declined everywhere, 
bringing about a collapse of private consumption, yet inequality did not rise notably, partly 
due to the collapse of asset prices hurting the rich and middle classes. Undoubtedly many 
poor households coped by cutting back on nutrition, postponing health care, taking some 
children out of school and other painful adjustments. However, the crisis turned around 
quicker than most commentators expected; it is now clear that it bottomed out in 1998 and 
recovery began in 1999. Moreover the impact differed: it was acute in Indonesia, severe in 
Thailand, Malaysia and Korea, and mild in the Philippines, where the preceding boom had 
been least. This, together with different inherited welfare regimes, resulted in different policy 
impacts (ADB/World Bank 2000).. 
 
In Korea, labour demand fell sharply and, though real wages fell, the major impact was on 
unemployment, especially among women. As a developed industrial economy, Korean 
households had fewer rural resources to fall back on. At this time, Korea had already begun a 
restructuring of trade, economic and social policy, under pressure from the US and the 
Uruguay Round, to liberalise its economic structure, and internal demonstrations by trades 
unions and social movements. The first wave of reforms introduced by the Rho Tae-woo 
government in 1988 included Medical Insurance, the National Pension Programme, the 
Minimum Wage and new labour laws. Following the crisis, a second wave of reforms in 
1998-99 followed, coinciding with the election of Kim Dae-jung as president. The economy 
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was significantly liberalised and the close links between the state and the chaebol loosened. 
This was coupled with moves towards a more Western welfare system. Expenditure on 
unemployment insurance, wage subsidies and public works programmes escalated, to a 
remarkable 4% of GDP in 1999. In addition, the National Health System was restructured and 
expanded,  pension entitlements were liberalised and an expanded Labour Standard Law 
introduced. A ‘Labour-Management-Government’ Committee was established which moved 
away, at least in name, from state-business symbiosis to a tripartite corporatism. In brief, 
greater exposure to the global economy and the subsequent crisis has undermined the 
influence and the social provisions of the chaebol and required the state to develop a more 
autonomous Western-style social policy. The unintended consequence of globalisation and 
liberalisation has been to expand the Korean welfare state (Shin 2000). 
 
In Malaysia and the Philippines the policy impact has been less, but for different reasons. As 
noted above, the Filipino welfare regime differs in its lower growth rate (and thus reliance on 
labour market income growth), and its chronically high poverty and unemployment rates. It 
has for long relied on officially-encouraged emigration as a safety valve and income source: 
the 1995 Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act and the Philippine Overseas 
Employment Administration both facilitate emigration and offer some degree of assistance to 
emigrants. Since most Filipino emigrants are not working in crisis-affected countries, their 
remittances have cushioned the impact of the crisis and resulted in little policy innovation. 
Malaysia, by contrast, has managed to cushion the domestic impact of a severe crisis by 
offloading its impact onto immigrant workers, which account for some 7-10% of the labour 
force (Oberndorfer and Berndt 2000). As a result the official unemployment rate in Malaysia 
barely rose from 2.5% in 1996 to 3.2% in 1998. In both countries labour migration has 
reduced the direct crisis impact and forestalled significant policy innovation. 
 
Thailand and Indonesia represent a different response. Both have strong rural hinterlands, 
where extensive smallholder agriculture acted as a shock absorber, and where escalating food 
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prices helped real incomes. The crisis led to a drastic fall in formal sector wages (by 34% in 
Indonesia in real terms) and a massive shift from the formal sector back to the informal and 
agricultural sectors. Poor people without this fallback suffered doubly from the mushrooming 
costs of food. High inflation in Indonesia also contributed to a sharp fall in real public 
spending on education and health, which Thailand protected more successfully. Both 
governments undertook special measures to keep children in school, to buttress food security 
(such as Indonesia’s cheap rice programme) and implemented public works programmes. In 
different ways both countries are emphasising decentralised policy responses. Indonesia 
introduced a local safety net programmes in July 1998 which soon accounted for 30% of total 
government expenditure. Despite the associated Community Monitoring concept, there has 
been evidence of short-termism and mis-spending (Ananta and Siregar 1999). Thailand is 
increasingly recognising the role of NGOs and community-based programmes, though the 
main emphasis is on credit and savings groups. In both countries, a strong rural base has 
helped cushion the impact of the crisis and strengthened the family component of the welfare 
mix. Public interventions have taken the form of building social safety nets and strengthening 
community-based elements of the welfare mix. 
 
Thus a common crisis, indubitably a result of the increased economic openness of this 
dynamic region of the world, has generated different policy responses in interaction with 
varying welfare regimes. The separate, distinctive regimes in Malaysia and the Philippines 
have been little affected, due to the cushion of immigrant labour in the former and emigrant 
labour in the latter. Indonesia and Thailand have relied primarily on the cushion provided by 
more closely integrated rural-urban households and families, but are encouraging community-
based social safety nets. Korea, more industrialised, urbanised and, in recent years, more 
democratic, has been propelled by the crisis towards a fully-fledged social insurance state. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
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‘Economic globalisation’ is changing the environment of welfare systems North and South, 
East and West. However, its impact is mediated by, first, forms of global economic and social 
governance (not discussed here), and second, by national and regional welfare regimes. The 
latter comprise the institutional bases of provision of livelihoods and security, the welfare 
outcomes resulting, and the patterns of stratification, interests and power which generate this 
matrix and contribute to its reproduction. This paper goes on to apply this framework to five 
countries in East Asia, interesting as examples of emerging market economies with restricted 
formal social policies but with relatively good welfare outcomes, all of which were engulfed 
by the East Asian crisi of 1997-99. Their welfare regimes have been described and analysed 
and the impact of the crisis has been then assessed. The conclusion is that a common crisis 
has engendered very different outcomes, with Korea moving swiftly to a developed social 
insurance state, Thailand and Indonesia developing a ‘third way’ based on community and 
local innovations, and Malaysia and the Philippines exhibiting less policy innovation. 
 
However, in all countries the crisis has sparked interest in social policy as a newly relevant 
domain of state policy. The older confidence in economic growth as the social policy is 
eroding. There is more awareness too of the growing domestic pressures for social policies 
stemming from population ageing, shifts towards more technologically based economies, 
urbanisation and nucleating households. The dangers of a further financial crisis are not 
insignificant and thus there is growing debate about the need for formal social protection 
systems. Yet these longer-term concerns will also be refracted through domestic regimes. It is 
unlikely that the other countries will follow Korea in its move towards extensive public 
provision. It is possible that the Malaysian EPF will provide a regional model for pension 
provision. It remains to be seen whether education and health services succumb to the current 
fads about privatisation or will build on the successful elements of universal public provision. 
One thing we can be certain of: ‘globalisation’ will not call forth uniform policy responses in 
the region, let alone across the developing world. 
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Figure 1:  External and internal pressures affecting welfare systems 
Source Pressure Consequences for advanced countries 
(examples) 
External: 
‘globalisation’ 
Trade competition Deindustrialisation; loss of unskilled jobs 
 Capital mobility and 
integrated production 
Tax competition; ‘social dumping’; 
reduced bargaining power of states and 
labour 
 Internationalised financial 
markets 
Decline of states’ macro-economic 
policy autonomy 
 
Internal: ‘post-
industrialisation
’ 
 
Slow growing service sector 
productivity 
 
The ‘trilemma’ of employment, equity 
and budget stability 
 Ageing Growing pension and health expenditure 
 Transformation of 
households 
Smaller household sizes, more single 
parent households, more women working 
 Maturing of social 
entitlements 
Automatic growth of social expenditure 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Components of the extended welfare mix 
 Domestic Supra-national 
State Domestic governance International organisations, national donors 
Market Domestic markets Global markets, MNCs 
Community Civil society, NGOs International NGOs 
Household Households International household strategies 
 
 
 
 
Table 1. Welfare regimes in East Asia: summary indicators 
  Kore
a  
Malaysi
a  
Thailan
d  
Philippine
s  
Indonesi
a  
Averag
e 
State Social spending/ GDP 11.0 8.2 5.9 6.0 3.1 6.8 
Market % private finance in 
health and education 
54 36 53 66 58 53 
House-
hold 
Private transfers: % 
income of receiving h/hs 
4 11 .. 12* 10 9 
        
Welfare 
outcome
s 
Human Development 
Index 
.85 .77 .75 .74 .68 .76 
 Poverty rate: <$2 p.p. a 
day 
.. 22 24 63 50 40 
 Gini index of inequality .36 .48 .46 .43 .37 .42 
        
Basic 
data 
Population (m) 46 22 61 75 204 408 
 Income pc (ppp) $000 12.3 7.0 5.8 3.5 2.8 6.2 
Source: Gough 2000. 
* Remittances from abroad amount to 10% GDP, and a higher share of household incomes, so are not 
fully reflected in this figure. 
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Table 2  The social impacts of the crisis in East Asia 
 Korea Malaysia Thailand Philippines Indonesia Average 
Change in pc private 
consumption 1997-8, % 
-10.2 -12.6 -15.1 1.3 -4.7 -8.3 
Inflation 1997-8, % 7.5 5.3 8.1 9.7 57.6 17.6 
Poverty increase % 
points 1996-98 
9.6 .. 1.5 .. 5.4 5.4 
Unemployment 1998, % 6.8 3.2 4.5 10.1 5.5 6.0 
Public education exp 
1997-98, % points 
-5.8 -13.7 -1.3 +3.8 -27.7 -12.1 
Public health exp 1997-
98, % points 
-3.2 -9.7 -10.7 -7.8 -12.2 -8.7 
Source: Manuelyan Atinc 2000: Table 6.1. 
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ENDNOTES 
 
1
1
 The research on which this paper is based was made possible by the UK Department for 
International Development who funded the research programme Social Policy in 
Development Contexts at the University of Bath, 1999-2001. Thanks to my doctoral students, 
Shin Dong-myeon and Kim Jin-wook, and colleagues in the Bath research group for valuable 
comments on an earlier draft. 
2
1
 Rodrik 1998; Garrett 1998; Scharpf 2000; Bonoli et al 2000; Alber and Standing 2000. 
3
1
 As evidenced by the preference ratios for a boy versus a girl child among married women 
awaiting a next child (Mason, cited in Rigg 1997: 222): 
 Philippines 0.9  
 Indonesia 1.1 
 Malaysia 1.2 
 Thailand 1.4 
 Korea  3.3 
 Bangladesh 3.3 
 Pakistan 4.9 
4
1
 The literature is now large. See Kwon 1998, Goodman, White and Kwon 1998, Jacobs 
1998 for some recent surveys. Most distinguish between the Northeast Asian countries 
(Japan, Korea and Taiwan) and the city-states of Hong Kong and Singapore. The analysis that 
follows relates to the former. 
5
1
 However, Esping-Andersen has warned against the dangers of over-emphasising path-
dependency in countries like Japan, where the welfare system ‘has not yet sunk its roots, 
institutionally speaking’ (1997: 179). This applies a fortiori to Southeast Asia. 
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